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Abstract—Emergence of crypto-ransomware has significantly
changed the cyber threat landscape. A crypto ransomware
removes data custodian access by encrypting valuable data
on victims’ computers and requests a ransom payment to re-
instantiate custodian access by decrypting data. Timely detec-
tion of ransomware very much depends on how quickly and
accurately system logs can be mined to hunt abnormalities and
stop the evil. In this paper we first setup an environment to
collect activity logs of 517 Locky ransomware samples, 535 Cerber
ransomware samples and 572 samples of TeslaCrypt ransomware.
We utilize Sequential Pattern Mining to find Maximal Frequent
Patterns (MFP) of activities within different ransomware families
as candidate features for classification using J48, Random Forest,
Bagging and MLP algorithms. We could achieve 99% accuracy
in detecting ransomware instances from goodware samples and
96.5% accuracy in detecting family of a given ransomware sam-
ple. Our results indicate usefulness and practicality of applying
pattern mining techniques in detection of good features for ran-
somware hunting. Moreover, we showed existence of distinctive
frequent patterns within different ransomware families which
can be used for identification of a ransomware sample family for
building intelligence about threat actors and threat profile of a
given target.
Index Terms—Malware, ransomware, crypto ransomware, ran-
somware detection, ransomware family detection.
I. INTRODUCTION
CYBERCRIMINALS pose a real and persistent threat tobusiness, government and financial institutions all around
the globe [1]. The volume, scope and cost of cybercrime all
remain on an upward trend [2]. Malicious programs have
always been an important tool in cyber criminals portfolios
and almost everyday we are detecting new variants of malware
programs [3]. Development and wide adoption of e-currencies
such as Bitcoin led to many changes in cybercriminal ac-
tivities including development of a new type of malware
called ransomware [4]. Ransomware is a type of malware
that removes a custodian access to her data and request for
a ransom payment to re-instantiate data access [5]. There are
two main types of ransomwares namely Locker and Crypto
ransomwares. The former locks a system and denies users’
access without making any changes to the data stored on the
system while the latter encrypts all or selected data usually
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using a strong cryptography algorithm such as AES or RSA
[6].
Ransomware has dominated the threat landscape in 2016
with annual increase rate of 267% [7]. It is estimated that
in 2014 only, cybercriminals have made more than $3 mil-
lion profit using ransomware programs [8]. These days, ran-
somware programs are indiscriminatly targeting all industries
ranging from healthcare to the banking sector and even power
grids [2]. The Crypto-ransomware programs are much more
popular than Lockers as almost always security engineers
could find ways to unlock a system without paying the
ransom while the only viable solution for decrypting strongly
encrypted data is to pay ransom and receive decryption key [9].
Therefore, focus of this paper is only on crypto-ransomware
and in the rest of the paper, the word ”ransomware” is actually
referring to the ”crypto-ransomware” only. It was already
reported that cyber security training and employee awareness
would reduce the risk of ransomware attacks [10]. However,
automated tools and techniques are required to detect ran-
somware applications before they are launched [11] or within
a short period after their execution [12]. The growing danger
of ransomware attacks requires new solutions for prevention,
detection and removing ransomwares programs.
In this paper, we are using a sequential pattern mining
technique to detect best features for classification of ran-
somware applications from benign apps as well as identifying
a ransomware sample family. We investigate usefulness of
our detected features by applying them in J48, Random
Forest, Bagging and MLP classification algorithms against a
dataset contains 517 Locky ransomware samples, 535 Cerber
ransomware samples, 572 samples of TeslaCrypt ransomware
and 220 standalone Windows Portable and Executable (PE32)
benign applications. We not only achieved 99% accuracy in
detection of ransomware samples and 96.5% in detection of
their families but reduced the detection time to less than 10
seconds of launching a ransom application; a third of the
time reported by earlier studies i.e. [13]. Our results are not
only indicative of usefulness of pattern mining techniques in
identification of best features for hunting ransomware applica-
tions but show how patterns of different ransomware families
can help in detecting a ransomware family which assist in
building intelligence about threats applicable to a given target.
To the best of authors knowledge this is the very first paper
applying sequence pattern mining to detect frequent features
of ransomware applications and to build vectored datasets of
ransomware applications logs. Our created datasets contain
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logs of Dynamic Link Libraries (DLL) activities, file system
activities and registry activities of 1624 ransomware samples
from three different families and 220 benign applications.
We are using widely accepted criteria namely True Positive
(TP), False Positive (FP), True Negative (TN), and False
Negative to evaluate our model [14]–[16]. TP is reflecting
total samples that correctly identified. FP shows incorrectly
identified samples. TN demonstrates the number of correctly
rejected samples, while FN shows incorrectly rejected sam-
ples. Precisions of a classification algorithm is a measure of
relevancy of results and is calculated by dividing TP by total of
FP and TP predicted by a classifier as shown in equation (1).
Recall reflects the proportion of positives that are correctly
identified by classification technique which is calculated by
dividing TP by total of TP and FN as shown in equation
(2). F-measure is showing the performance of a classification
algorithm and is calculated by the harmonic mean of precision
and recall as shown in equation (3).
Precision =
TP
TP + FP
(1)
Recall =
TP
TP + FN
(2)
F −measure = 2 × Precision×Recall
Precision+Recall
(3)
We will also report Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC)
that is a potentially powerful metric for comparison of different
classifiers, because it is invariant against skewness of classes
in the dataset. In a ROC curve the true positive rate is plotted
in function of the false positive rate for different thresholds. In
addition to ROC, Area Under the Curve (AUC) is a measure
of how well a parameter can be used to distinguish between
two classes. AUC is a single value that summarizes the ROC
by calculating the area of the convex shape below the ROC
curve. AUC can be between 0 and 1, where the value of 1
shows optimal point of perfect prediction.
Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC) [17] provides an-
other measures of quality to compare different classifiers [18].
The MCC value is between −1 and +1, where in cases of
perfect prediction it gives +1. −1 coefficient shows total
disagreement between prediction and observation while the
coefficient value of 0 indicates that the classifier does not work
better than a random prediction. MCC is also a useful measure
of classifier performance against imbalanced datasets. While
Precision, Recall or F-measure values in a random guessing
would be higher than 0.5, MCC value would be around 0
for random guessing. Therefore, for making sure that our
classifiers are far from random classifiers, we will compute
MCC values for each classifier. The values can be computed
using equation (7) which is composed of equations (4), (5)
and (6), where N is the total number of samples.
N = TP + FP + TN + FN (4)
S =
TP + FN
N
(5)
P =
TP + FP
N
(6)
MCC =
TP
N − S ×N√
PS(1− S)(1− P ) (7)
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II reviews some related research in while Section III explains
our method for collecting and preprocessing of data in a
controlled environment. We describe feature extraction and
vectorization in Section IV. Section V introduces our approach
for ransomware detection followed by Section VI that de-
scribes our performance in detecting ransomwares families.
Finally, section VII discusses about the achievements of this
paper and concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Ransomware programs are reportedly becoming a dominant
tool for cybercriminals and a growing threat to our ICT in-
frastructure [4], [19], [20]. The possibility of using encryption
techniques to encrypt users data as part of a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack is known for a very long time [21]. However,
recent adoption of eCurrencies such as BitCoin provided
many new opportunities for attackers including receiving a
ransom payment for decrypting users data [21]. In spite of its
simplicity and primitive utilization of cryptographic techniques
[22], ransomware programs are becoming a major tool in cyber
criminals toolset [23]. For any cyber threat, prevention is ideal
but detection is a must and ransomware is not an exception
[3], [24].
Situational cyber security awareness plays an important role
in preventing cyber-attacks [25]. An educational framework
that is tailored to ransomware threats [10] as well as a
tool which mimicked ransomware attacks [26] proved to be
useful in reducing ransomware infections. Moreover, technical
countermeasures such verifying applications trustworthiness
when calling a crypto library [27] or minimizing attack surface
by limiting end-users privilege proved effective in preventive
ransomware attacks [9].
Most ransomwares detection solutions are relying on filesys-
tem [28]–[30] and registry events [31] to identify malicious
behaviors. Investigation of 1359 ransomware samples showed
that majority of ransomware samples are using similar APIs
and generating similar logs of filesystem activities [29]. For
example, using 20 types of filesystem and registry events
as features of a Bayesian Network model against 20 Win-
dows ransomware samples resulted to an accurate ransomware
detection with F-Measure of 0.93 [31]. UNVEIL [29] as a
rasnsomware classification system utilized filesystem events
to distinguish 13,637 ransomwares from a dataset of 148,223
malware samples with accuracy of 96.3%. CloudRPS [32] was
a cloud-based ransomware detection system which relied on
abnormal behaviors such as conversion of large quantities of
files in a short interval to detect ransomware samples. EldeRan
[13] utilized association between different operating system
events to build a matrix of applications activities and to detect
ransomware samples within 30 seconds of their execution with
AUC of 0.995. Timely detection of a ransomware upon its
execution is very crucial and systems that fail to detect ran-
somware in less than 10 seconds are not considered effective
[5]. Moreover, timely identification of a ransomware family
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would assist in building intelligence about applicable threat
actors and threat profile for a given target.
III. DATA CREATION
We have downloaded 1624 Windows Portable Executable
(PE32) ransomware samples from virustotal.com which were
active in the period of February 2016 to March 2017 as
reported by RansomwareTracker.abuse.ch. Collected samples
belong to three families of ransomware namely 517 Locky
samples, 535 Cerber samples and 572 samples of TeslaCrypt.
The best type of goodware counterpart for malware applica-
tions are portable and standalone benign apps [25]. Therefore,
we have collected all 220 available portable Windows PE32
benign applications from portableapps.com1 in April 2017 to
serve as goodware counterpart of our dataset.
We have setup the environment shown in Fig. 2 to collect
logs of ransomware and goodware samples runtime activities.
The Controller application on the host machine is randomly
selecting a ransomware or goodware sample and passes it
through FTP server to the Virtual Machine (VM). When
the sample is successfully transferred, the Controller notifies
the Launcher app to run the ProcessMonitor application and
executes a given sample. Similar to the previous research [5],
the first 10 seconds log of ransomware and benign applications
runtime activities is collected and the created log file is up-
loaded to the Log repository on the host machine. Since major-
ity of benign applications require human interactions to run (i.e
clicking on a button), we have developed an application called
PyWinMonkey which automates user interactions with an ap-
plication. When the log file is successfully stored on the host
machine, the Controller application reverts the VM back to its
original copy and passes the next sample. It is notable that Py-
WinMonkey is similar to Monkey2 Android app which utilized
in many previous Android malware research papers [33] for
mimicking human interactions. We have used Python 3.6.1 to
develop Controller, Launcher and PyWinMonkey apps (accessi-
ble at https://github.com/sajadhomayoun/PyWinMonkey) and
run ProcessMonitor V3.31 on Windows10 build number 10240
on a computer with Core i7 CPU with 8 cores of 4GHz and
16GB of RAM. For each and every process, ProcessMonitor
records loaded Dynamic Linked Libraries (DLLs), file system
activities and registry activities. Therefore, we will have three
sets of events namely Registry Events Set, which includes
all registry events, DLL Events Set, which includes all DLL
events and FileSystem Events Set, which contains all Filesys-
tem events as listed in Table I. Moreover, EventType(E) is a
procedure that returns the type of given event (R for Registry
events, F for Filesystem events, and D for DLL events) as Fig.
1.
As we will be using a sequential pattern mining technique
(MG-FSM) to detect candidate features for classification task,
we should convert our data into a sequential dataset which
is a collection of sequences such as D = {S1, S2, ..., Sn}
where Si represents a sequentially ordered set of events. We
have created a sequence of runtime events for each and every
1https://portableapps.com/apps
2https://developer.android.com/studio/test/monkey.html
1: procedure EVENTTYPE(Event E)
2: if E ∈ Registry Events Set return R
3: if E ∈ Filesystem Events Set return F
4: if E ∈ DLL Events Set return D
5: end procedure
Fig. 1. Determining Even Type of a given event.
TABLE I
LIST OF ACTIVITIES CAN BE CAPTURED BY PROCESS MONITOR
Activity Type List
Registry RegQueryKey, RegOpenKey, RegQueryValue,
RegCloseKey, RegCreateKey, RegSetInfoKey,
RegEnumKey, RegQueryKeySecurity, Re-
gEnumValue, RegSetValue, RegDeleteValue,
RegQueryMultipleValueKey, RegDeleteKey,
RegLoadKey, RegFlushKey
File QueryNameInformationFile, ReadFile,
CreateFile, QueryBasicInformationFile,
CloseFile, QueryStandardInformationFile,
CreateFileMapping, QuerySizeInformation-
Volume, FileSystemControl, QueryDirectory,
WriteFile, QueryNetworkOpenInformation-
File, QueryRemoteProtocolInformation,
QuerySecurityFile, LockFile, UnlockFileSin-
gle, DeviceIoControl, SetEndOfFileInfor-
mationFile, FlushBuffersFile, SetAllocation-
InformationFile, SetBasicInformationFile,
QueryAttributeTagFile, QueryFileInternalIn-
formationFile, QueryInformationVolume,
QueryAttributeInformationVolume,
SetRenameInformationFile, QueryNormalized-
NameInformationFile, NotifyChangeDirectory,
QueryFullSizeInformationVolume,
SetSecurityFile, QueryStreamInformationFile,
SetDispositionInformationFile, QueryEaIn-
formationFile, QueryAllInformationFile,
QueryIdInformation, SetPositionInforma-
tionFile, QueryPositionInformationFile,
SetValidDataLengthInformationFile
DLL LoadImage
ransomware and benign application. Si represents a sequence
of all events E caused by launching an application i ordered
by time as follow:
Si = {E1,i(argE1), E2,i(argE2), ..., E2,i(argEn)} where
Ex,y(argEx) represents event x for an application y and
argEx shows the argument passed to the event Ex.
For example, {LoadImage(C :
\system32\gdi32.dll)}, {LoadImage(ReadFile(C :
\Windows\SysWOW64\wininet.dll)} shows a sequence
of two events where the first event loads gdi32.dll in the
memory of calling process (hence C : \system32\gdi32.dll
is the parameter for this event) and the second event reads
wininet.dll file located at C : \Windows\SysWOW64. The
size of each sequence depends on the number of events that
are called by an application and varies between different
apps.
Once all sequences are created, we have utilized the Outlier
Factor [34] technique to remove any outlier sequence from
our dataset similar to [35]. The Outlier Factor technique first
extracts all frequent patterns from a dataset and then detects
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Fig. 2. Environment Setup to Capture Malware and Goodware Activities Log
TABLE II
CREATED DATASETS
Dataset Number of Sequences
D Locky 450
D Cerber 470
D TeslaCrypt 507
D Goodware 200
D OF 174
outlier sequences as those that contain the least frequent
patterns in a given dataset.
Table II reflects final datasets with the number of sequences
in each dataset. D Locky represents sequences of Locky
ransomware samples, D Cerber shows Cerber ransomware
sequences and D TeslaCrypt includes sequences of TeslaCrypt
ransomware samples. D Ransomware represents combined
sequences of all ransomware samples while D Goodware
includes sequences of events of all benign applications. We
randomly collected 52 Locky, 50 Cerber, 52 TeslaCrypt and
20 benign applications sequences in a separated dataset for
over-fitting test as well (D OF).
IV. FEATURE EXTRACTION AND VECTORIZATION
To detect the best features for classification task, we need
to first define detectable patterns of events and then uti-
lize a pattern mining algorithm to find Maximal Sequential
Patterns (MSP) collections within each dataset. Afterwards,
every sequence within every relevant dataset is traversed based
on a given MSP collection to provide features for training
classifiers.
Sequential pattern mining techniques discover all subse-
quences (Sequential Patterns) that appear in a given sequen-
tial dataset with frequency of no less than a user-specified
threshold (minsup) [36]. A sequence α = {a1, a2, ..., an} is
called a subsequence of another sequence β = {b1, b2, ..., bm}
and β is a super-sequence of α, denoted as α ⊆ β, if there
exists integers 1 ≤ j1 < j2 < ... < jn ≤ m such that
a1 ⊆ bj1 , a2 ⊆ bj2 , ..., an ⊆ bjn. A sequence is said to be
frequent and called a Sequential Pattern (SP) in a sequential
dataset D if sup α ≥ minsup, where sup α (support of
α) denotes the frequency of occurrence of α in a given
sequential dataset D. Moreover, if a Sequential Pattern SP
is not contained in any other sequential patterns, it is called a
Maximal Sequential Pattern (MSP). Collection of all MSPs
with in a given sequential dataset D can be denoted as a
Maximal Sequential Pattern Collection (MCD). Members of
a MC are in format of (P, sup P ) where P is a MSP and
sup P shows the frequency of occurrence of P in a given
dataset D.
There are two major types of sequential pattern mining
algorithms to extract MSPs namely Apriori-based and frequent
pattern growth. Apriori-based algorithms are detecting MSPs
based on the fact that any subset of a frequent pattern must
be frequent. However, recursive nature of Apriori-based algo-
rithms increases complexity and running time of the algorithm
[37]. On the other side, frequent pattern growth algorithms
are using divide-and-conquer techniques to narrow down the
search space MSPs. To detect MSPs in this study, we utilize
a widely used frequent pattern growth algorithm [38] called
”Mind the Gap: Frequent Sequence Mining (MG-FSM)”
[39] with minsup of 50%. Applying MG-FSM against our
datasets generates four MSP collections namely MCD Locky ,
MCD Cerber, MCD TeslaCrypt and MCD Ransowmare.
MCD = {(Px, sup Px)|sup Px ≥ minsup ∧
∀Px(6 ∃Py(Px ⊆ Py))}.
We can distinguish three types of atomic MSPs and six types
of single step transition MSPs within our sequential datasets as
shown in Table III. Atomic MSPs are representing continuous
events of the same type i.e. the atomic MSP of F represents
continuous Filesystem events. Single step transitions MSPs are
representing a transition from one atomic MSP to another. For
example, MSP of RD represents a sequence of registry events
(R atomic MSP) followed by a sequence of DLL events (D
atomic MSP). It is notable that we only define two types of
atomic and single step transition MSP to avoid sparsity in
extracted features.
A MSP P = {E1, ..., En} is atomic if
∀Ex,Ey∈P∧Ex 6=Ey (EventType(Ex) == EventType(Ey)).
A MSP P = {E1, ..., En} is a single step transition if
∃Ex,Ey∈P∧Ex 6=Ey (EventType(Ex) 6= EventType(Ey)).
We can define a set that contains all MSP types (MSP
Type Set) and a procedure (MSPType(MSP P) in Fig. 3) that
returns type of given sequence S as follow:
MSP Type Set = {R,F,D,RF,RD,FR,FD,DR,DF}.
Support Ratio (SR) of a MSP is a value in the range of
[0,1] that shows the possibility of occurrence of the MSP in
a given dataset of ransomware and is calculated by dividing
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1: procedure MSPTYPE(MSP P)
2: for all (Ex, Ey ∈ P ) ∧ (x ≤ i) ∧ (y > i) ∧ (i, y ≤ n)
do
3: if EventType(Ex) == EventType(Ey) then
4: if EventType(Ex) == R return R
5: if EventType(Ex) == F return F
6: if EventType(Ex) == D return D
7: else
8: if EventType(Ex) == R ∧
EventType(Ey) == F return RF
9: if EventType(Ex) == R ∧
EventType(Ey) == D return RD
10: if EventType(Ex) == F ∧
EventType(Ey) == R return FR
11: if EventType(Ex) == F ∧
EventType(Ey) == D return FD
12: if EventType(Ex) == D ∧
EventType(Ey) == R return DR
13: if EventType(Ex) == D ∧
EventType(Ey) == F return DF
14: end if
15: end for
16: end procedure
Fig. 3. Finding MSP Type of a given MSP.
TABLE III
MAXIMAL SEQUENTIAL PATTERN TYPES
Type Description
R All events must be registry
F All events must be file
D All events must be actions on dll files
RF The MFP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a registry event to a file
event
RD The MFP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a registry event to a dll
event
FR The MFP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a file event to a registry
event
FD The MFP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a file event to a dll event
DR The MFP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a dll event to a registry
event
DF The MFP has one or more transitions while the
first transition is from a dll event to a file event
frequency of occurrences of MSP (sup MSP ) by the total
number of all ransomware sequences (γ) in a given dataset
D. For every sequence S we can define a Vector of size nine
(9) that contains SR value of every MSP type detected in MSP
Collection MC within sequence S as follow:
V ector(S)MC = {(SR R), (SR F ), (SR D), (SR RF ),
(SR RD), (SR FR), (SR FD), (SR DR), (SR DF )}
SR value of every MSP Type of a sequence for a given MC
can be calculated using CalculateSR procedure shown in Fig
4. When vector of all sequences within a sequential dataset
1: procedure CALCULATESR(Sequence S, MSP Collection
MC, MSP Type Set T)
2: SR P Total = 0
3: for all P ∈MC do
4: if p ⊆ S AND MSPType(P ) == T then
5: SR P Total = SR P Total + (
sup P
γ
)
6: end if
7: end for
8: return SR P Total
9: end procedure
Fig. 4. SR calculation algorithm for sequence S.
D using a MSP Collection MC is created, we will have a
Vectored Dataset V DD,MC .
Moreover, for every sequence S we can define a SuperVector
of S as a set of Vectors created using MSPs collected from
different dataset i.e. MCD1 ,MCD2 , ...,MCDn as follow:
SuperV ector(S) = {V ector(S)MC1 , V ector(S)MC2 ,
..., V ector(S)MCn} where MC1 to MCn reflects MSP Col-
lections of different datasets. Size of a SuperVector with n
vectors is calculated by n × m where m is size of each
vector (9 in this research). By calculating SuperVector for all
sequences within a dataset D, we will have Super Vectored
Dataset SV DD.
V. HUNTING FOR EVIL: RANSOMWARE DETECTION
To detect best features (MSP types) for classifying
ransomware from benign applications we created a
dataset MCD Total by combining D Ransomware and
D Goodware and then generated a vectored dataset
V DD Total,MCRansomware . We then utilized greedy stepwise
search method of CfsSubsetEval [40] of Weka3.8.1 with
V DD Total,MCRansomware and found that MSP Types of R
(Registry), D (DLLs) and FD (File and DLL) may provide
best distinction between ransomware and goodware samples
(see Fig. 5). As shown in Fig. 5a ransomware applications
are tend to conduct a much wider range of Registry activities
in compare with gooodware apps. As shown in Fig. 5b,
majority of benign applications were conducting similar
DLL activities while there were much more variations in
ransomware samples DLL events. Ransomware applications
are taking a variety of Filesystem to DLL transitions while
goodware samples were mainly taking only two specific
Filesystem to DLL events transitions (see Fig. 5c).
We have utilized R, D, and FD as features to train four
classifiers namely J48, Random Forest, Bagging, and Multi
Layer Perception (MLP) using V DD Total,MCRansomware and
10-fold cross validation technique for evaluation. As shown
in Table IV, all classifiers achieved F-measure of 0.99 with a
low false positive rate (FPR ≤ 0.04). Moreover, similarities
between ROC curves of different classifiers (see Fig 6) proves
that there is not much difference between performance of
different classifiers which is another indication of suitability
of our features for classifying ransomware and benign applica-
tions. As shown in Fig 7, AUC value for all classifiers is quite
high (more than 0.990) while AUC value of Bagging classifier
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Fig. 5. Histogram of the probability of SR values for ransomware and
goodware.
TABLE IV
CLASSIFIERS PERFORMANCE ON V DD Total,MCRansomware
Classifier TPR FPR F-Measure
J48 0.994 0.040 0.994
Random Forest 0.993 0.040 0.993
Bagging 0.994 0.039 0.977
MLP 0.994 0.035 0.994
(0.995) is very close to an optimal prediction. The MCC value
of all classifiers is more than 0.96 while Random Forest and
Bagging achieved MCC of almost +1 which is very close to
a perfect prediction.
To show that we have not over-fitted our classifiers, we
tested all classifiers using on V DD OF,MCRansomware . As
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Fig. 6. ROC diagrams for classifiers.
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Fig. 8. MCC of classifiers for detecting ransomwares
shown in Table V all classifiers achieved accuracy of 0.994
in classifying unforeseen ransomware and goodware samples
too.
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TABLE V
RESULTS OF CLASSIFIERS ON V DD OF,MCRansomware FOR DETECTING
RANSOMWARE
Classifier Accuracy
J48 0.994
Random Forest 0.994
Bagging 0.994
MLP 0.994
VI. THREAT INTELLIGENCE: DETECTION OF A
RANSOMWARE FAMILY
To investigate performance of classifiers in detection
of a ransomware family we have created D TotalFamily
dataset which contains all sequences from D Locky,
D Cerber, D TeslaCrypt and D Goodware. We then gener-
ated V DD TotalFamily,MCLocky , V DD TotalFamily,MCCerber
and V DD TotalFamily,MCTeslaCrypt vectored datasets and fed
them to CfsSubsetEval of Weka3.8.1. All in all 13 candidate
features were detected for classification of ransomware fami-
lies as shown in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9a depicts the distribution of SR R, SR RF, SR FD and
SR DF values in V DD TotalFamily,MCLocky . The interesting
point in Fig. 9a is that Locky samples have taken higher
values for all selected features in V DD TotalFamily,MCLocky
in compare with Cerber, TeslaCrypt and goodware samples.
This is because V DD TotalFamily,MCLocky is vectored using
MCLocky , so it is vivid that more MSPs are matched to
Locky samples which is reflected in higher SR values for
corresponding features. Fig. 9a also shows that behaviours
of Cerber and TeslaCrypt samples have been different from
Locky, and this leads to smaller values for features R, RF, FD
and DF.
Fig. 9b shows histograms of distribution of SR val-
ues namely SR R, SR D, SR FR, SR FD and SR DF in
V DD TotalFamily,MCCerber . The histograms in Fig. 9b show
higher SR values for Cerber samples in compare with samples
of other classes and it means Cerber samples matched more
MSPs from MCCerber.
Fig. 9c illustrates the histogram of SR values for SR R,
SR F, SR RF and SR FD for V DD TotalFamily,MCTeslaCrypt .
The diagrams in Fig. 9c present higher SR values for Tes-
laCrypt samples in compare with Locky, Cerber and goodware
samples. Fig. 9 also demonstrates that goodware samples
always take smaller and far SR values for each feature because
goodwares behave differently in compare with ransomwares.
In other words, goodware samples have matched fewer MSPs
from MCLocky,MCCerber and MCTeslaCrypt, and subse-
quently they have taken lower SR values.
As detection of ransomware families is a multi-class classi-
fication task with four class labels (Locky, Cerber, TeslaCrypt
and Goodware), therefore, we have trained J48, Random
Forest, Bagging and MLP with a multi-class classifier using
SV DD TotalFamily dataset with 13 selected features in Fig.
9.
Table VI presents performance of all classifiers obtained
from 10-fold cross validation. Obtained minimum weighted
TABLE VI
THE CLASSIFIERS PERFORMANCE ON SV DD TotalFamily
Classifier TPR FPR F-Measure MCC
J48 0.981 0.006 0.981 0.974
Random Forest 0.983 0.006 0.983 0.978
Bagging 0.980 0.007 0.980 0.974
MLP 0.980 0.007 0.980 0.973
TABLE VII
RESULTS OF CLASSIFIERS ON DATASET SV DD OF FOR DETECTING
RANSOMWARE FAMILY
Classifier Accuracy
J48 0.947
Random Forest 0.965
Bagging 0.959
MLP 0.959
average [41] F-Measure of 0.983 with FPR ≤ 0.006 reflects
suitability of our features for detecting ransomware samples
families. MCC values of more than 0.95 for all classifiers
also indicate quality of our features in enabling classifiers
to provide an almost perfect prediction. Finally, as shown
in Table VII our features enabled classifiers to offer an
accurate prediction (≥ 0.965) even on unforeseen samples
(SV DD OF ).
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this paper, by combining sequential pattern mining for
feature identification with machine learning classification tech-
niques we could accurately distinguish between ransomware
and goodware samples and identify given ransomware fam-
ilies with in first 10 seconds of a ransomware execution.
We achieved minimum F-measure of 0.994 with minimum
AUC value of 0.99 in detection of ransomware samples from
goodware using Registry (R) events, DLL (D) events and
Filesystem to Registry (FD) transitions as features for J48,
Random Forest, Bagging and MLP classifiers. We achieved
F-Measure of more than 0.98 with FPR of less than 0.007
in detection of a given ransomware family using 13 se-
lected features detected in this study. Reported features for
differentiating ransomware and benign applications can be
used for effective hunting of a ransomware while features
reported for ransomware family classification are great for
building intelligence about threat profiles applicable to a given
target. Applying other classification techniques such as fuzzy
classification can be considered as a future work of this
study. Moreover, utilization of Stream Data Mining techniques
to reduce ransomware detection time is another interesting
extension of this study.
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